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Abstract: This Trends article discusses the concept of ‘Predecisional Distortion’ in the context of how
juries make decisions.
Predecisional distortion is a construct often associated with the psychology of jury decision making. The
construct frequently is interpreted as the biased interpretation by a juror of new evidence in support of
whatever verdict is favored by that juror as a trial progresses.
At issue is whether predecisional distortion should be construed as a bias at all, above or beyond the
notion that all human sensation, perception, and cognition are biased. Supporters of predecisional
distortion as bias seem to necessarily contend that prior information should have no bearing on
succeeding information; that new information should be interpreted out of context; in so far as that
context comprises or is formed by prior information; and that any and all information must be
considered in isolation from its context or from other information.
This atomistic position on the appropriateness and implicit adaptiveness of cognitive functioning
certainly belies extensive psychological research on the many merits of informational integration. In
fact, the notion that each new snippet of information should be processed in light of an individual’s best
momentary assessment concerning the nature of the world has face validity, is compatible with
descriptive accounts of human phenomenology, and is consonant with state-of-the-art analyses of
cognitive functioning.
What predecisional distortion researchers seem to support is a cognitive perspective wherein each
individual would maintain a moment-to-moment virginal stance on the nature of reality. Such a stance
may be pure as snow and as beneficial as snow for the pursuit of justice. (See Bodenhausen, G.V.
(1988). Stereotypic biases in social decision making and memory: Testing process models of stereotype
use. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 726-737; Carlson, K.A., & Russo, J.E. (2001).
Biased interpretation of evidence by mock jurors. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 7, 91103; Hastie, R., & Rasinski, K.A. (1988). The concept of accuracy in social judgment . In D. Bar-Tal &
A.W. Kruglanski (Eds.). The social psychology of knowledge. (pp. 193-208). Cambridge University Press;
Smith, V.L. (1993). When prior knowledge and law collide: Helping jurors use the law. Law and Human
Behavior, 17, 507-536.) (Keywords: Justice, Predicisional Distortion.)
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